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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ALLIED MATERIALS COMPANY,
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants

vs.

Case No. 8372

SALT LAKE, GARFIELD & WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
Plaintiff and Respond,ent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are undisputed.
i>laintiff and its predecessors in title operate a railroad on trackage extending west from the city limits
of Halt Lake City. In 1897, Plaintiff's predecessor instituted condemnation proceedings to increase the width
of its right-of-way 'by 33~ feet for a length of 89,9.25
feet. By :a decree dated December 6, 1897, the District
Court condemned this land and awarded it to the railroad.
Such decree was not recorded by the Railroad in the
office of the Oounty Recorder as required by law, (Title
78-3'4-15 UCA 1953 - Comp. Laws of Utah 1888,
§'3856) until November 6, 1952, almost 55 years later,
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and not until after Defendant Allied had purchased its
iand. [Exhibit 2, p. 68-70.]
On August 9, 1909, two deeds were executed by certain predecessors in title to Defendants (Exhibit 2, p. 23
and 24) covering a large piece of property in sections 3
and 34, and including the property now owned by Defendants. One deed contained, after the legal description of
the properties in both sections, this recitation :

'' * ·if: * Less that portion of said land awarded to
the 8altair Beach Railroad Company for rightof-way and also less that portion of said land
deeded to the Western Pacific Railway Company.''
The other contained a similar provision. Subsequently,
the portion of the land covered by these deeds was broken up into many smaller portions. No subsequent conveyance in Defendant's chain of title refers to this decree.
(Exhibit 2) Plaintiffs claim that this recitation made by
a stranger placed Defendants on constructive notice of
Plaintiffs right under the decree of 1897.
Plaintiff or its predecessor at some undetennined
time had erected a single track line along its right-ofway ~and had placed pole lines on each side of this track
holding up overhead electric wires. (R. p. 14) The pole
lines cross property which is both outside and inside
the claimed right-of-way of Plaintiff (e.g. Plaintiff has
never taken any steps to acquire, either judicially or by
conveyance, the property over which its poles run directly
east of Defendant's land.) (R. p. 45) The poles of Plaintiff are 8 or 9 feet within the boundary 'aS set forth in
2
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the legal description of Defendant's property. (R. p.
54-55) The sole objects ever placed by Plaintiff on the
property in dispute are the poles and guy and trolley
wires. Plaintiff claims that the physical presence of
these objects gave Defendants constructive notice of the
claimed fee simple interest of Plaintiff under the decree
of 1897.
On June 4, 19·51, Defendant, Allied Materials Company acquired a piece of property 200 feet wide for a
valuable consideration. (Exhibit 2, p. 67) The deed description designated a lot of depth of 660 feet, which was
the depth of the lot prior to the 1897 condemnation
award, and it therefore conflicted with the railroad's
claim. This depth has been used in all descriptions since
1897. Defendant Allied had no actual knowledge of any
claimed interest of the railroad to the property. It had
had an abstract prepared and examined, and had had
the property surveyed. Defendant Allied subsequently
constructed a fence along the pole line and stored materials within the enclosure. Shortly thereafter, the railroad made demand upon defendants to remove the fence,
and on November 6, 1952, recorded the decree of 1897.
(Exhibit 2, p. 68) On October 30, 1953, Allied conveyed
the property by the same description to defendant
Ketchum Builders Supply Company. (Exhibit 2, p. 72)
Plaintiff filed an action praying that title be quieted in
it on the basis of its unrecorded decree, and that Defendants be ejected from such property. (R. p. 1-3). Defendant's answered claiming among other things, that they
')
o)
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were purchasers for value in good faith without notice.
(R. p. 4-7C)
On the basis of these facts, the trial Court, sitting
without a jury, held that defendants had purchased the
property with constructive notice of the interest of the
railroad, such notice being given both by the record and
by the physical facts. Defendants appeal from both
findings as to notice. (R. p. 64) There being no dispute
as to the facts, Defendants ask this Court to hold that
as a matter of law these facts do not justify a finding of
constructive notice.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE RECORD NOTICE OF
THE DECREE OF 1897.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
USE OF THE PROPERTY MADE BY PLAINTIFF GAVE
DEFENDANTS CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMED FEE INTEREST.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING FINDINGS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
A. THE DECREE INCLUDES LAND NOT CLAIMED
BY DEFENDANTS, BUT BY THIRD PARTIES.
B. THERE IS NO PROBATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE
PAYMENT OF TAXES BY PLAINTIFF OVER THE DISPUTED LAND.

4
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ARGUMENT
Defendants believe the problem here transcends
ownership of a 33ya foot strip of land. It involves the
setting of a standard o.f care in title examination which
has great significance to all purchasers and the legal
profession as a whole.
POINT I
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE RECORD NOTICE OF THE DECREE OF 1897.

The railroad did not record i'ts decree with the
county recorder prior to the purchase of the property
by defendants, and defendants had no actual knowledge
of the railroad's alleged interest. Defendants, therefore, claim to be purchasers in good faith for value
without notice of such decree, (Utah Code Annotated,
1953, ~ 57-3-3). The railroad claims that defendants had
not actual, but constructive notice of their claimed interest, both by the record and by the physical facts. In
urging the existence of constructive record notice, the
railroad must rely upon the recitation in third party's
deed of 1909, which was recorded.
What is the basis for constructive record notice?
Pomeroy has stated:
Such notice must '' ...... find its ultimate foundation and only support in motives of policy and
expediency." 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,
4th Ed. ( 19'18) p. 1364.
rrhe question of constructive record notice should he considered in the light of our recording statutes and the
avowed policies behind them.

5
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Such statutes incorporate within the1nselves the concept of estoppel.
"Registry statutes are legislative extensions of
the doctrine of estoppel. They forbid those who
have, and yet withhold fron1 the record, their
muniments of title, from asserting the title these
muniments disclose against others who have innocently purchased the land from him who appears by the record to be the owner while the
holders of the real title silently conceal it. They
rest upon and enforce the equitable proposition
that he who knowingly conceals his ownership
when he ought to disclose it shall not assert it to
the detriment of his neighbor who has acted in
reliance upon his silence." Boynton vs. l-Ia.gg~art,
(1903, CCA 8) 120 Fed. 819, at 823.
In the light of this policy, the author of a leading article on this question has stated that the burden
of proof of such notice should be placed upon the negligent non-recorder.
A "means of attaining [the desired end of such
recording statutes] would be by providing for the
divestment of an unrecorded title in favor of a
subsequent purchaser, who should therefore, as
respects all matters of substance and procedure,
be treated as the deliberately appointed favorite
of the statute; (3) that to the utmost possible
extent such purchaser should be protected in relying upon the record, and the burden of proof in
litigation between him and the negligent nonrecorder of the prior deed should invariably be
upon the latter .... "
Philbrick, Limits of Record Search, and Therefore of Notice, 9·3 U. of Pa. Law Review, 125 at
p. 127
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"Notice is an equity doctrine. As such it must
rest on fairness and reasonableness. As respects
whom~ Manifestly, the subsequent purchaser."
Philbrick, Ibid, p. 132.
''If, in dealing with the recording problem, the
party to be favored is the subsequent purchaser,
certain ineluctable conclusions follow. One is
that the courts should constantly and consistently
put the burden of proving notice on the prior
Grantee, both in inquiry notice and in doubtful
cases of record notice. Another conclusion is that
such purchaser should not be defeated by a doctrine of notic,e t.hat is unreasonable in the burden
it puts on him; and this either as respects to requirement of an unreasonable search of the record, or as respects what puts him on inquiry, or
as respects the nature or extent of the inquiry to
be made." (emphasis added)
Philbrick, Ibid, page 155.
r:ehis burden is not met by vague or ambiguous record
recitation.
"Nobody would question the statement that recitals in deeds in a purchaser's chain of title bar
bona fides only when the matter referred to,
when incorporated into the reciting deed, reveals
the hostile and superior right with reasonable certainty. Vague or ambiguous records give no
notice * * * It is not enough to confront him [the
purchaser] with a legal problem, a solution of
which by a court perhaps few could predict."
Philbrick, Ibid, p. 271.
Indeed, as one standard text has stated:
"The power of one who records an instrument to
impose upon third persons dealing with the property the duty of searching elsewhere for matters
7
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pertinent to the instrument recorded is, and
clearly ought to be, a rather lin1ited one."
82 A.L.R. p. 412.
This court has repeatedly held that constructive
notice will be determined by the use of the test of the
"reasonably prudent man," 0' Reilly v. M cLewn, 84
Utah 551, 37 P. 2d 770, (1934); LeVine v. Whitehouse,
37 Utah 228, 109 P. 2d (1910).
The above considerations should be kept in mind
in any determination of what is reasonable and prudent.
The deed of 1909 covered an area much larger than
that now claimed by defendants. At the end of the description covering this much larger piece of property, it
is stated:
''less that portion of said land awarded to the
Saltair Beach Railroad Company for right of
way, and also less that part of the land deeded to
the Western Pacific Railroad Company."
Such reference is clearly both vague and ambiguous.
It does not outline the parties to the action, nor does it
set forth the property covered by the decree referred
to. A purchaser is not notified merely by suspicious or
speculative inferences. U.S. v. Routt County Coal Co.
(1918, CCA8), 248 F. 4!85. The court in this case·, in
disregarding arguments as to alleged constructive notice,
said, "the fact ... is as susceptible of an innocent explanation as a fraudulent one."
It is appellant's contention that the existence of a
reasonable ground for disreg,arding a recitation which
might refer to a conflicting property reference is enough
8
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tee·:-

to destroy any constructive notice which might otherwise
be implied. In the case of a negligent non-recorder, the
rule is not what one might have discovered, but only what
one had no reasonable excuse for not discovering.
In the instant case there are two convincing reasons
why a person could reasonably assume that the reference
could be disregarded.
rrhe land covered by the 1909 deed was a large parcel
on each side of the railroad tracks. This large parcel
was gradually divided and conveyed in smaller bits. The
abstract of the defendants, of course, contains only those
instruments which included defendant's land. As these
parcels got smaller, references to the decree disappeared.
This could quite reasonably lead a title examiner to the
conclusion that such reservation in the 1909 deed referred to property not corvered by the abstractor's certificate, which was therefore, omitted as no longer relevant. Thus, for example, the decree might well have
affected land to the west of the defendants' property,
in which event, it would not have appeared in defendants' abstract even if it had been of record.
~lore concretely, the 1909 deeds conveyed property
in Section 34 (including the disputed property) and in
Section 3, immediately to the south of this land. It is
not clear which parcel the exception clause refers to.
As the Western Pacific Railway tracks run through
Section 3 (Exhibit 1) it must be assumed that the recitation "less that portion of said land deeded to the Western Pacific Railway Company" refers to this property

9
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alone. (The fact that defendants' abstract does not contain this deed is perfectly consistent with the analysis,
because it is irrelevant to defendants if it does not deal
with their property). Is it not reasonable to asswne that
the reservation as to the Saltair Beach Railroad applied
to the Section 3 land as well~ Section 3 also abutted the
Saltair trackage. This analysis is confirmed by a subsequent deed of both the Section 34 and Section 3 properties (abstract, Exhibit 2, Page 49) where the parcels
are clearly divided, the property being described as follows:
1. Commencing at the Southwest corner of
the Southeast 1,4 of Section 34, Township 1 North,
Range 1 West, 'Salt Lake Meridian, running thence
East 54_0 rods; thence North 40 rods ; thence
West 54_0 rods; thence South 40 rods to the beginning.
2. All of Lot 2, Section 3, Township 1 South,
Range 1 West, of Salt Lake Meridian, less railroad and streets.
The reservation "less railroads and streets" obviously
applies only to the Section 3 land.
A second reason why a reasonable man would not
pay attention to the 1909 deed is the fact that the Utah
law requires and did require at the time of the 1897
decree that in the case of a condemnation award "A
copy of the judgment must be filed in the office of the
Recorder of the County, and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose
therein specified." (Title 78-34-15, UCA, 1953; 2 Comp.
Laws of Utah 1888 §38'56). (Emphasis added.)
10
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One can properly assume that the law has been
complied with and that such a decree was recorded. It
the decree had been recorded as required by law and it
did not cover defendant's land, it would not, of course,
have appeared in defendants' abstract ·and there would
be no reason for further inquiry as to any reference to
it. In the light of the statutory requirements and the
absence of such a decree in the instant abstract, defendants can quite properly assume this to have been the
case.

~~~-

:1it·

[:~

,,
~ lj

......................

~~~',

'

Plaintiff, by failing to comply with a law making
mandatory the recordation of its decree, held, because
of its own act, no claim of record to the disputed property. The existence of the statutory duty of record and
a presumed compliance therewith is certainly a sufficient reason to discount vague and to defendants, ambiguous recitations by third parties as to plaintiff's claim.
True enough, defendant could conceivably, operating on some premonition, have gone to the Clerk of the
District Court and run the index to the parties litigant
to determine all cases in which the railroad's predecessor was a party prior to August 9, 1909, to procure the
files of such actions, and to search them for property
covered by the legal description in defendants' deed, but
to torture such conduct into that of a reasonably prudent
man is to pervert the function of the recording statutes.
Such a requirement is to twist the law from placing the
burden of giving notice upon the negligent non-recorder
to requiring arduous research from the innocent purchaser.
11
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Even when apprised of the existence of such a
decree the record shows that it took six n1an hours· by
trained abstractors to find the document in question.
(R. p. 42) Sueh pains cannot be required of the reasonably prudent man.
This is a practical world. Attorneys who examine
abstracts are practical men. In expecting them to certify
to the state of a title, certainly some limits must be
placed on the search which is required of them. To force
the title examiner to arduously trace down every possible conflict, even when good reasons exist for completely disregarding it, would make the duties of and
responsibility for abstract examination something that
only attorneys with unlimited time, or large title insurance companies with their comprehensive physical facilities, could assume.
In assuming what is "reasonable," is it not relevant
that in all of the various transactions since 1909 the
legal desc-ription has never been modified? The depth
used has always been 660 feet, which conflicts with plaintiff's claim. One can only assume that title examination
even at that time placed no one on sufficient notice of
plaintiff's claim to modify the legal description. Each
previous party has boldly warranted this full description.
One of the most convincing tests of reasonableness is
surely the action taken by others faced with the identical
problem.
The law must never stray too far from what a layInan calls "common sense" for it is upon this that the
1:.2
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great strength of the common law is buttressed. "Constructive" notice is a legal fiction. Its sole justification
is a belief that no reasonable man would have acted otherwise. To protect the railroad's negligence of 50 years
by a vague reference placed of record by a third party
does not, it is submitted, come within this concept. It is,
therefore, submitted that the T·rial Court erred in finding that appellants were placed on -constructive notice
of the railroad's interest.

~~

~m-

POINT II

!!~

THERE IS NO POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFF OVER THE
DISPUTED LAND WHICH GIVES CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
OF A CLAIMED FEE INTEREST.

~i

uj.

The Trial Court has further found that the physical
facts gave the appellants notice of the railroad's claimed
fee interest. The only physical facts that could lead to
this could be (a) the proximity of the railroad tracks to
the disputed property, although not upon it, or (b) the
existence of poles, and guy and trolley wires upon the
disputed property.
As to the presence of the trackage, questions of this
nature generally arose at the turn of the century when
railroads were acquiring or expanding their rights-ofway. Two decisions of that period quite clearly point
out that adjoining owners to railroad property were
charged with notice of the railroad's ownership only to
the extent of actual use. In Va.rwig vs. Cleveland CO. &
St. L. Railro1ad Company, 44 NE. 92, (1896) the Supreme
Court of Ohio said :

13
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''And this is carrying the doctrine of presumptiot
far enough. In no aspect of the case could he be
found to assume that the company had acquired
the right· to lay additional track. Had the company placed its release on record at the proper
time, that, under the statute, would have been
notice. Having chosen to keep it off the record
for more than six months, and until after its
Grantors sold to a bona fide purchaser, that company cannot now he heard to assert that the title
of that purchaser is impaired by its unrecorded
release. The statute but adopts the principal of
equity which holds that he in consequence of
whose negligence a fraud has been committed
shall sustain any resulting loss, and the rule is
just, wise and salutary." p. 95
In the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rwilwa;y Compamy
Welch, (Neb.) 118 NW 1116, (1908), a
railroad acquired a strip of land in 1890 which was 100
feet north and 200 feet south of the center of its tracks.
It did not record the document showing acquisition of
this property until 1904. In the meantime, a plat was
recorded by a municipality in 1891 which overlapped
with the property acquired by the railroad. The town
sold this property to the defendant in 189'1. The defendant recorded his deed in the same year and built upon
the property. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held the
defendant to be a bona fide purchaser and held that the
admission that the railroad had opera ted the track since
before the date of defendant's acquisition was not notice

vs.
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to the world of the limits of its grant. In a companion
case, Chicago, Rock Lslarnd arnd Pacific Railway Company vs. Welch, (Neb.) 118 NW 1117, the court held that
the recitation in a previous contract that land was "subject, however, to the easement of said railroad in its
right-of-way" was still not enough to impart constructive
notice.
vVould the existence of poles some eight feet within
the disputed property give any additional notice of a
fee interest 1
Merrill, in his work on notice has stated:
"[Possession] 'is sometimes notice of the real
right and title of the possessor, and sometimes
not,' depewdant upon the extent to which the particular po.ssession seems inconsistent with the
apparent. title. It is to be used 'not blindly but
according to the surrounding circumstances
affecting the rationale of the doctrine of notice.'
Ordinarily the administration of the rules is in
the hands of the court, where the evidence is undisputed, ***Since the sole office of possession
is to arouse inquiry, it has no effect in determining the nature of the search nor where it should
be made . . . It is a common statement that an
equivocal possession will not suffice as a source
of inquiry." 1 Merrill on Notice, Section 102, p.
125-127. (Emphasis added.)
Defendants concede that the existence of poles upon
property gives notice of an alleged pole line easement
because that particular possession is inconsistent with
Defendant's apparent title to this extent. But this is a8
far as such notice goes. There is nothing inconsistent
with the existence of a non-record pole line easement and

15
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an owner's title. If the existence of a pole line were
notice of a claimed fee interest of an even greater area
every title examiner of Salt Lake residential property
would have to include a trip to the Utah Power and Light
Company as a standard part of his title procedure.
Obviously, this is not the case. Utah hmne owners have
safely assumed such non-record pole lines to be supported only by easements.
Physical possession is notice of a claimed interest of
a nature necessary to support the type of possession in
question. Overhanging eaves are not notice of a claimed
fee interest. A five story building is notice of more than
a mere easement.
The problems of any other analysis are obvious.
Assuming arguendo that a pole line is notice of a claimed
fee interest, what is the extent of the land so claimed~
The few feet on which the poles rests~ The strip 20 feet
wide~ 30 feet wide~ Is one pole placed in a corner of
a large tract notice of a claimed fee interest in the entire
property~ Obviously not.
The problem might be approached by asking what
sort of prescriptive right could the railroad get by maintaining such pole line and wires for the required statutory period. (e.g. What interest has the railroad acquired
in the property to the east of appellant, where they have
never condemned the property and over which their
pole line now runs). Can there be any doubt that a pole
line obtains nothing more than a prescriptive easement,
entitling its owner only to enter upon the property for

16
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the reasonable maintenance and repair of said poles~
One of the principal characteristics of an easement
is the absence of all rights to participate in the profits
of the soil charged with it. As a standard text has
stated in giving examples of such an interest:
''For example, the right of an owner of an estate
to erect and maintain, or cause to be erected and
maintained, for his own benefit, a line of telegraph poles over the estate of another is held to
constitute an easement." 17 Am. Jur. p. 924,
Easements, Section 2. (emphasis added)
In discussing what forms of physical user give notice
of a claimed easement which may be discovered by reasonable inspection, the same text states :
"Examples of apparent easements include canals
and ditches, chimney flues, ferry landings, light
and air, pipes, poles and wires, private ways,
privies, supports of encroaching structures and
water rights." 17 Am. Jur. p. 1019, Easements,
Section 130. (emphasis added)
Other cases have held pole lines to be notice of mere
easements. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company vs. Russell, (1910 Conn.) 78 A 324; Indianapolis and C. Traction Compatny v. Arlington Teleph.
Co., (1911 Ind.), 95 NE 280.
Respondent railroad has never fenced the property
in question (despite the requirement in the decree of condemnation that this be done). It has, at most exerted an
easement interest.
Certainly there is no evidence of acts of "unequivocal
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

character indicating a claim of ownership." Day vs.
St.eele, Utah 184 Pac. (2d) 216, 219. The full limits of
the railroad claim, could, of course, have been clearly
set forth for all to see if the railroad had decided to
place them of record. In the absence of such a precaution the notice given by acts of possession must be viewed
restrictively.
It is, therefore, submitted that the Trial Court erred
in finding that the pole lines, guy wires, and trolley wires
of the railroad gave constructive notice of a fee interest
in the land in question.
POINT III
CERTAIN FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

A. ·The Decree covers land not under litigation.
The Trial Court has decreed that plaintiff is owner
of a strip of property .899.2·5 feet by 330 feet (Decree,
par 1). 'This description would include land which is not
now and never has been owned or claimed by Defendants,
whose claimed interest is a strip only 200 feet in length.
The description in the decree should be restricted to the
title of the property claimed by defendants.
B. There is no probative evidence that Plaintiff
paid taxes over the property.
The Trial Court found that the taxes on the disputed property were paid by the railroad. It is submitted
that the sole evidence as to the payment of taxes by
the railroad was that taxes were paid over the "right-
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of-way" of plaintiffs, such ''right-of-way" not being described as to width. Whether the particular land in dispute is part of such "right-of-way" is the general question under litigation. Therefore, such evidence has no
value and such finding is not justified.

CONCLUSION
We submit, accordingly, that under the uncontradicted facts of this case, the lower court did err in finding that:
(1) the recitations in the 1909 deeds could reasonably give constructive record to defendants of the Decree
of 1897.

('2) the physical acts of plaintiff with regard to
such land gave defendants constructive notice to defendants of the Decree of 1897.
·( 3) the findings and decree of the court cover more
property than that actually claimed by defendants and
by reciting payments of taxes by plaintiff which are
unsupported by the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
Albert J'. Colton of
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY
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